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lo,
hile precious little law is specific
to art, a rich and complex body of
social norms and customs effec-
tively governs artworld transactions and
informs the resolution of artworld disputes.
In any case, a smattering of scholars study
art law and a similar number of lawyers
practice it. In this essay, I will provide a
brief overview of art law from three differ-
ent perspectives: the artist, the art market,
and the art museum.
THE LAW OF THE ARTIST
Art is as art does. Artists make art, and the
public determines whether it matters and
what it means. But the law shapes what
artists can do, how they can do it, and
what they can do with it. And in turn, art
challenges the law to explain and justify its
assumptions about meaning and aesthetic
value.'Q AC COPYRIGHT
Copyright is indifferent to
art. For better or worse, it
automatically protects every
"original work of authorship"
as soon as it is "fixed in a tan-
gible medium of expression."' "Original"
just means "not copied" and "minimally
creative," resulting in a comically low stan-
dard for copyright protection.' When an
artist creates a painting, every brushstroke
is protected by copyright the moment
brush touches canvas. But likewise, when
a teenager composes a tweet, each word
is protected by copyright as soon as it is
written. Nevertheless, some things are cat-
egorically unprotected by copyright, such
as white-page telephone directories and
shovels.'
Moreover, copyright explicitly ignores the
aesthetic value of the works it protects.5
This "aesthetic nondiscrimination" princi-
ple was intended to ensure that courts don't
discriminate against either avant-garde or
commercial works. But it also requires
courts to treat all works identically, even
though the scope of copyright protec-
tion has gradually become immeasurably
broader, granting ever more protection to
an ever increasing range of works, and even
as technology has transformed the ways in
which we use those works.
'The purpose of copyright is to encourage
authors to create new works by giving them
an economic incentive. Without copyright,
authors couldn't recover the costs associated
with creating and marketing their works.
Copyright is supposed to solve this market
failure by giving them the exclusive right to
make and distribute copies. Writers get the
exclusive right to sell copies of their books,
and musicians get the exclusive right to sell
copies of their songs.
In theory, copyright should be largely
irrelevant to artists. Copyright protects
intangible "works," not the tangible "copies"
in which a work is reproduced. According
to copyright, a painting is just a unique
"copy" of the intangible work it embodies.
But artists typically sell unique objects, not
copies. The art market relies on scarcity,
not volume. Leonardo Da Vinci's Salvator
Mundi is worth $450 million, but a repro-
duction is worth essentially nothing.
But in practice, many artists sell both
unique objects and reproductions, and
copyright enables them to do so. When
artists sell paintings, they keep the copy-
right, and can sell as many reproductions
as they like. For many commercial artists,
their reproduction rights can be far more
valuable than their actual paintings. And
the same is true for some popular fine art-
ists, like Andy Warhol.
In other words, copyright seemingly gives
artists the best of both worlds. It's either
irrelevant or beneficial. But in some cir-
cumstances, it can actually work to their
disadvantage. For example, many countries
have created "resale royalty rights"that give
artists the right to claim a percentage of
the resale price of art they created.' And
in 1976, California tried to create a similar
right.' But courts have held that the Cal-
ifornia law is preempted by the "first sale"
doctrine, which provides that transferring a
copy of a work terminates the distribution
right in that copy. As a consequence, when
an artist sells a painting, the artist cannot
control its resale or demand a cut of the
profits.'
B MORAL R OHTS
In theory, copyright does give artists some
special protections. The Berne Convention
provides that member states must give
authors certain moral rights, including
rights to attribution and integrity Soon
after the United States joined the Berne
Convention in 1989, Congress passed the
Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA"), which
gives the "author" of a "work of visual art"
certain rights of attribution and integrity."
The right of attribution gives artists the
right to claim authorship of their works,
and disclaim authorship of works they
didn't create.12 The right of integrity gives
artists the right to prevent the "inten-
tional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification" of their work, if it would be
"prejudicial" to their "honor or reputation,"
and the right "to prevent any destruction
of a work of recognized stature."1 VARA
rights cannot be transferred, but can be
waived in writing, and terminate at death."
In practice, VARA is largely irrelevant,
because the interests of artists and owners
are usually aligned. After all, art is valu-
able only if it is attributed to the artist
and kept in good condition. But some-
times, the interests of artists and owners
diverge. Occasionally, artists have asserted
the VARA right of attribution to disavow
a work, typically claiming that the owner
misrepresented or failed to maintain it. For
example, Cady Noland has asserted the
VARA attribution right to disavow res-
torations of her works Log Cabin (1990)
and Cowboys Milking (1990)." But more
commonly, artists have asserted the VARA
right of integrity to prevent the alteration
or destruction of their work.
Cady Nohnd, Log Cabin (1990)
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The Achilles heel of VARA is waiver.
While most countries make moral rights
non-waivable, VARA permits waiver.
Sophisticated arts organizations typically
require a VARA waiver whenever relevant.
But many smaller arts organizations are
unaware of VARA or their potential lia-
bility for infringement of VARA rights.
Organizations commissioning site-specific
works should consider potential VARA
liability and request a VARA waiver. And
artists creating site-specific works should
know about their VARA rights and at least
negotiate any VARA waiver.
VARA issues usually arise when the owner
of a site-specific work wants to move, alter,
or destroy it. If the artist's VARA rights
are intact, it can be possible to prevent - or
at least limit - the changes. For example,
in 2005, the Massachusetts Museum of
Contemporary Art ("Mass MoCA") com-
missioned Christoph Buichel to create
Training Ground for Democracy, a large
interactive art installation.16 The relation-
ship soon soured, and Biichel disavowed
the unfinished work. In 2007, Mass MoCA
filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking
to exhibit the work. Biichel counterclaimed,
alleging infringement of his VARA rights
of attribution and integrity. Ultimately,
Biichel won a partial victory, in large part
because he never waived his VARA rights.
But more commonly, courts conclude that
artists have waived their VARA rights or
that VARA simply doesn't apply. For exam-
ple, in 1984, Chapman Kelley received
permission from the Chicago Park District
to install Wildflower Works, a site-specific
work consisting of two elliptical flowerbeds
planted with an assortment of wildflow-
ers, each about the size of a football field.
In 2004, the Park District changed the
flowerbeds into smaller rectangles planted
with different flowers. Kelley sued the Park
District for infringement of his VARA
integrity right, but the court held copyright
could not protect Wildflower Works, because
a garden is not a "work of authorship ...
fixed in a tangible medium.""
While artists occasionally try to assert their
VARA rights, they are rarely successful, in
large part because courts are sensitive to
the circumstances. VARA rights typically
become an issue when the owner of a site-
specific work wants to use the site for a
different purpose. Understandably, courts
are reluctant to hold that site-specific art
is forever, regardless of the wishes of future
owners. Extension of the VARA integrity
right to site-specificity would be a power-
ful disincentive to commissioning public
art, not to mention a hardship to property
owners unaware of the risks associated with
VARA.
C. FAIR USE
The "fair use" doctrine is the most import-
ant exception to copyright, intended to
protect free speech and increase the eco-
nomic efficiency of copyright." Essentially,
it provides that certain uses of a copyrighted
work are non-infringing.The key questions
are whether the use is "transformative" in
some way and whether it competes with
the original use. At least in theory, the first
question is subjective and the second is
objective: is the use justified and is it
efficient?"9
Artists have always borrowed ideas and
images from the world around them,
including from each other. Until relatively
recently, they rarely worried about fair use,
for the same reason they rarely worried
about copyright. Artists typically made
unique objects, so copyright and copying
just didn't matter. But with the prolifera-
tion of technologies that enabled artists to
reproduce both their own works and works
made by others in a congeries of different
ways, copyright and fair use suddenly
became relevant. And no one knew how
to answer the questions they presented.
While artists had always assumed they
Andy Warhol,
Campbell's Soup
Cans (1962)
could use anything they liked, pop art took
that assumption to new extremes. Andy
Warhol notoriously used images from any
source imaginable in order to create his
enigmatic commentaries on contemporary
life and culture.
Ironically, when he used commercial marks
and works, the owners usually turned the
other cheek or simply asked him to stop.20
When Warhol created his iconic series of
paintings Campbell's Soup Cans (1962), the
Campbell's Soup Company initially con-
sidered suing for trademark infringement,
but desisted, and was ultimately thrilled by
the free publicity.
By contrast, other artists were often less
understanding. When Warhol used part
of Patricia Caulfield's 1964 photograph of
hibiscus flowers to create his Flowers (1965)
series of painting, Caulfield threatened to
sue him for copyright infringement and
demanded a cash settlement.
The rise of appropriation art in the 1980s
brought the tension between copyright
and fair use in artistic practice into relief.
Sherrie Levine was able to create her con-
troversial appropriated photographs like
After Walker Evans (1981) only because the
photographs she copied were in the public
domain. And many artists were infuriated
by Elaine Sturtevant's brilliantly subversive
imitations of their works, with the notable
exception of Warhol. When asked about his
own technique, he replied, "I don't know,
ask Elaine."
Copyright infringement actions were inev-
itable, and have helped define scope and
application of the fair use doctrine, for
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better or worse. As is so often the case,
artists often unwittingly push at the bound-
aries of the law, and expose the limitations
of copyright doctrine, which otherwise
might remain unnoticed.
Initially, courts were skeptical of the legit-
imacy of appropriation art, and dismissive
of its fair use claims. And the scapegoat
was Jeff Koons. In 1980, Art Rogers created
the photograph Puppies. He sold copies and
licensed it for use by third parties, includ-
ing on postcards. In 1987, Koons purchased
a postcard of Puppies, and hired Demetz
Studio in Ortessi, Italy to create four
painted wooden sculptures based on the
postcard. Koons sold three of the sculptures
at his exhibition "Banality Show" for a total
of $367,000, and kept the fourth. Rogers
sued Koons for copyright infringement, and
Koons claimed fair use. The court rejected
Koons's defense, essentially because Koons's
work parodied the banality of society at
large, rather than Rogers's photograph in
particular.2 1
Koons was undeterred, probably because his
profits far exceeded his losses. But probably
also because he was cussedly determined
to make his art his way. So he kept on
appropriating. Andrea Blanch created the
photograph Silk Sandals by Gucci, which
was published as a Gucci ad in the August
2000 issue ofAllure. Soon afterward, Koons
created the painting Niagara, a collage of
images from many different sources, includ-
ing Blanch's photo. In 2003, Blanch sued
Koons for copyright infringement. Koons
claimed fair use, and the court agreed, hold-
ing that his use of Blanch's photograph was
transformative, because he used it to com-
ment on society.
In 2015 another artist, Richard Prince,
presented the show New Portraits at the
Gagosian gallery. It consisted of 38 paint-
ings, made by printing an Instagram post
onto a large canvas. Essentially, Prince
chose Instagram photos, made nonsensical
comments on the posts, edited a screen-
cap of the post to eliminate unwanted
comments, and had the edited screencap
printed onto a canvas. Some of the people
whose posts he copied were flattered, but
many were livid, and several have sued for
copyright infringement. Prince claims fair
use, but it is unclear how the court will
decide.2 1
Ultimately, courts struggle to apply copy-
right to art and reach coherent results,
because copyright doctrine is not designed
to accommodate art world norms. Copy-
right imagines works of authorship as
expressive commodities, but contemporary
art prizes inscrutable unique objects. The
fair use doctrine asks judges to evaluate the
justification for copying, but contemporary
art disdains normativity. Some scholars
argue that copyright should ignore art,
because there is no market justification
for copyright protection. 24 Yet, artists are
among the most litigious copyright owners,
despite their own proclivity to copy others.
"Fair use for me, but not for thee" is the
byline.
THE LAW OF THE ART MARKET
The "art market" is a euphemism for the
rarefied market in fine art. Modern tech-
nology enables the creation, reproduction,
and distribution of art at a cost that asymp-
totically approaches zero. But the art
market abjures reproductions, unless they
declare themselves originals, and depends
on scarcity, rather than abundance. In an
age of reproduction, the art market insists
on the aura of authenticitV
Essentially, the art market is an insider
market for positional goods. Leading
sources of art market information esti-
mate total sales of $45 to $55 billion per
year.26 But these estimates are tantamount
to guesses, as reliable information about the
art market is so scarce. Information about
the "primary market" is almost nonexistent.
And information about the "secondary
market" is limited and unreliable.
2 7
The primary art market comprises the
market in which artworks are sold for the
first time. While art transactions take many
forms, the paradigmatic sale is from gallery
to collector. But which gallery, which col-
lector, and why? That is the money question.
The primary art market is notoriously
exclusive and opaque. Commercial busi-
nesses sell products to consumers at market
prices. Art galleries do not. At least, the
relevant ones do not. Commercial galler--
ies sell works to all comers at more or less
fixed prices, but galleries that constitute the
primary art market do not. On the contrary,
they put works on public display, with the
implication those works are available for
purchase. But they do not provide prices
or offer to sell works to anyone but a select
few. The hoi polloi get the brush off. They
can look at the art, but they can't actually
buy it, at any price."
Only certain insiders can actually purchase
works from the "market maker" galleries of
the art market. And their degree of insider
status determines their level of access and
the price they must pay for any particular
work. Often, galleries agree to sell especially
desirable works subject to conditions. For
example, a gallery may require a prospec-
tive buyer to purchase two works by the
same artist and agree to donate one to a
museum. Many of the sales on the primary
art market occur at exclusive art fairs held
in vacation destinations around the world.
And many more are works never shown to
the public at all.
The defining characteristic of the primary
BENCH & BAR I 9
Andrea Blanch, Silk Sandals by Gucci (2000) &JeffKoons, Niagara (2000)
art market is confidentiality. Handshake
deals are the norm. Written agreements
are rare, and rarely enforced. Transactions
are uniformly private and secret, unless the
buyer wants to make them public. And even
then, only limited information is disclosed.
Accordingly, it is impossible even to esti-
mate the size of the primary art market
with any degree of accuracy. And that is
precisely the way participants in the pri-
mary market want it to stay.
The secondary market is the resale market
for art, consisting primarily of public and
private auctions, and private sales. More
information is available about the sec-
ondary market than the primary market,
because the results of public auctions are
publicly available. However, much of the
secondary market remains opaque, as results
of private auctions sales are rarely disclosed.
Only a tiny fraction of works sold on the
primary market have any meaningful value
on the secondary market. And of that tiny
fraction, the overwhelming majority are
works initially sold by market maker gal-
leries. But for everyone other than primary
market insiders, investing in art on the pri-
mary market is tantamount to investing in
lottery tickets. A vanishingly small number
of people do it successfully, but owe their
success to luck, and little more.
Of course, the tiny fraction of works that
have a secondary market are often fantas-
tically valuable. And some collectors have
invested in art on the secondary market
very successfully. Just like in any other
market, the key to success is information
and access. Both are at a premium.
An art investment fund is simply a fund
intended to generate a profit by investing
in art.The idea has existed since the emer-
gence of the modern art market at the end
of the 19th century.'Ihe first art fund was
La Peau de l'Ours, a syndicate created in
1904 by Andr6 Level, a Parisian art collec-
tor. In the 1970s, the British Rail Pension
Fund invested £40 million in art. And since
2000, a number of art funds have solicited
investors.
The premise of an art fund is simple: buy
low and sell high. The rationale is that the
art market is uncorrelated with other mar-
kets, so investors can use art investments
to hedge against risk. And the advantage
is that investors can make a relatively
small investment in a diversified portfolio
of high-value works, and avoid the costs
associated with actual ownership.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the art
market is actually uncorrelated with other
markets to any significant degree. And a
diversification strategy may be incapable
of compensating for the disadvantages of
art funds relative to private investors, pri-
marily access and information. Art funds
typically lack insider access to the primary
market, where private investors make the
largest profits. Art funds typically lack
insider information about which works are
available and attractive. In addition, private
collectors can leverage tax advantages that
art funds cannot. Financial technology may
enable art funds to overcome these liabili-
ties, but the jury is still out. "
THE LAW OF THE ART MUSEUM
Despite vast quantities of money changing
hands in these markets, the overwhelming
majority of valuable works belong to art
museums, which are almost uniformly
charitable organizations dedicated to edu-
cating the public about art and culture.
Among other things, museums remove
works from the private art market into the
public sector. In many respects, they are
natural complements. Museums enable the
art market to manage supply and maintain
scarcity in the face of relatively inelastic
demand, and the market subsidizes muse-
ums by providing them with both product
and donors. Unsurprisingly, laws and norms
governing art museums have developed in
light of their symbiotic relationship with
the art market.
A. CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS
In the 19th and early 20th centuries art
museums could acquire notable works on
the primary and secondary markets. Today,
it is beyond the means of most art muse-
ums to purchase anything but minor works,
with the exception of museums funded and
controlled by autocratic governments. As a
consequence, art museums typically obtain
the vast majority of works in their collec-
tion via donation, often as a bequest.
B. DEACCESSIONING
"Deaccessioning" is the polite term for an
art museum selling works from its collec-
tion. Art museums typically show about five
percent of the works in their collection."o
The rest languishes in storage, imposing
costs without generating revenue. Normally,
charitable organizations sell non-perform-
ing assets. But art museums do not, at least
in part because they fear the consequences.
Most art museums are members of the
American Alliance of Museums ("AAM"),
and most art museum directors are mem-
bers of the Association of Art Museum
Directors ("AAMD"). The AAM and the
AAMD have both adopted deaccessioning
rules holding that museums can sell art only
in order to buy art, and that it is "unethi-
cal" for museums to sell art for any other
reason." But why?
The AAM and AAMD claim that muse-
ums cannot sell art because they hold it
in the "public trust."'Ihat is both false and
inconsistent with their own rules. The
"public trust" doctrine provides that public
entities cannot sell certain public assets
to private parties.12 But art museums are
typically private charitable entities, so the
art they own is not a public asset, even
though museums are obligated to benefit
the public, like any other charitable orga-
nization. Private parties buy and sell art all
the time. So can museums.
Moreover, if museums hold art in the public
trust, then they can't sell it for any reason.
But the AAM and AAMD rules explicitly
allow museums to sell art in order to buy
art. Does this make sense? Either museums
hold art in the public trust or they don't.
How can their right to sell art depend on
how they use the proceeds?
Deaccessioning opponents often argue that
museums own art subject to charitable trusts
that limit their ability to sell it. Sometimes,
they are right, especially about particular
works. But usually, they are wrong. Muse-
ums rarely form charitable trusts limiting
their right to sell art, and rarely accept
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donations of art subject to gift restrictions.
They also argue that collectors won't
donate art if museums can sell it. This is
implausible, because collectors have many
incentives to donate art, including income
tax deduction, estate tax avoidance, and
prestige. Most collectors donate works
museums want, and collectors who donate
undesirable works rarely care what happens
to them. In any case, the rules allow muse-
ums to sell works anyway, so long as they
buy more art.
Finally, they argue that deaccessioning rules
discipline a museum's board of directors,
by precluding it from relying on the muse-
um's collection as a rainy day fund. But
deaccessioning rules ultimately punish
only the museum, not the board of direc-
tors. Deaccessioning rules do nothing to
prevent mismanagement while it is hap-
pening. They only prevent museums from
liquidating assets in order to remedy the
consequences of mismanagement. Any
other charitable organization would be
expected to terminate ineffective directors
and install a new board capable of preserv-
ing the institution. Only art museums are
expected to just close up shop and parcel
out their assets to other museums. Surely a
museum's board of directors can and should
authorize the sale of part of its collection in
order to preserve the institution. "We had
to destroy the museum in order to save it"
cannot be the only answer.
In any case, the AAM and AAMD deac-
cessioning rules are legally toothless. They
can complain about the kinds of deacces-
sioning they disapprove, but they can't
actually stop it. At the end of the day, muse-
ums own their collections, and can dispose
of them as they wish, so long as they do
so in the best interests of the institution.
Indeed, a museum board arguably has a
legal duty to deaccession works if necessary
to preserve the institution.
Unfortunately, all too often state Attor-
neys General are persuaded to intervene in
deaccessioning disputes, despite the lack of
legal justification. For example, when the
City of Detroit filed for municipal bank-
ruptcy, creditors asked it to sell the Detroit
Institute of Arts ("DIA") collection, which
was City property.The Michigan Attorney
General chose to intervene with a brief
making all of the conventional anti-deac-
cessioning arguments.The court essentially
ignored the Attorney General's brief and
allowed the City to sell the collection to
the DIA, a compromise solution that both
generated assets the City could use to sat-
isfy its liabilities to its pensioners, and kept
the collection in Detroit.
C. OPEN ACCESS ART
Art museums collectively own the over-
whelming majority of the most important
works of art in existence. Many of those
works are in the public domain, and repro-
ductions should be made available to the
public to use as it sees fit. Even works still
protected by copyright should be made
available to the public, to the extent possi-
ble. But historically, many museums have
restricted access to their collections, and
limited the right to reproduce works in
their collections.
Courts have explicitly held that copyright
cannot protect photographic reproductions
of public domain works. 3 4 Even so, many
museums prohibit visitors from taking
photographs of works in their collec-
tions, and impose contractual limitations
on the right to use reproductions of those
works. In some cases, artists and collectors
have insisted on such restrictions as a gift
condition. In other cases, museums have
restricted access in the hope of creating a
revenue stream through fees.
However, in recent years, some museums
have begun to take the opposite approach,
and focus on increasing digital access to
their collections. For example, the Metro-
politan Museum of Art recently committed
to make reproductions of all of the public
domain works in its collection freely avail-
able to the public with no restrictions on
use.-" As charitable organizations, muse-
ums have a legal duty to benefit the public.
While there are many ways to satisfy that
duty, adopting an open access approach to
collection management ensures both public
benefit and public support.
D. CULTURAL PROPERTY
While the term "cultural property" has
different meanings in different contexts,
broadly speaking it refers to any form of
property that has a special connection to a
particular cultural group or country."
Most countries claim ownership of some
or all antiquities discovered at archaeolog-
ical sites within their borders as cultural
property Countries of origin use cultural
property laws to prevent both the theft of
their cultural heritage and the destruction
of archaeological data. And the Hague
Convention invokes cultural property in an
effort to prevent the intentional or negli-
gent destruction of historic sites in wartime,
albeit with limited success.
But cultural property laws vary wildly
among countries. Some countries only
claim ownership of antiquities discovered
on public land. Others claim ownership of
all antiquities, no matter where they are
discovered. And some extend the scope
of their cultural property laws to include
works owned by private individuals, includ-
ing artworks created relatively recently. For
example, many European countries restrict
the sale or export of artworks located within
their borders, irrespective of the provenance
or age of the work. Some countries even
claim ownership of intangible cultural prac-
tices as "cultural heritage.""
Museums typically run afoul of cultural
property laws when they own or purchase
antiquities with unclear or disputed
provenance. ihe international market in
antiquities consists substantially in looted
works. While most countries have always
prohibited the importation and sale of
stolen property, historically many did
not prohibit the importation of property
in violation of another country's export
restrictions, facilitating the black market in
looted antiquities. The UNESCO Conven-
tion was intended to address this problem
by encouraging countries to prohibit the
importation of looted antiquities.
Scholars and policymakers disagree about
how to address the ongoing illicit trade in
antiquities. While most argue for more
rigorous enforcement of existing cultural
property laws," some argue that existing
laws are ineffective and should be revised in
light of their underlying purposes. 0 How-
ever, the illicit trade in looted antiquities
continues, largely unabated.
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E. HOLOCAUST ART
RESTITUTION
Among its many other crimes, the Nazi
regime stole massive quantities of cultural
property from other countries and citi-
zens, including hundreds of thousands of
artworks. After VVWII, the Allied forces
began the effort returning the stolen art-
works to their rightful owners. Given the
quantity of works and difficulty of identi-
fying and locating the rightful owners, they
were not always successful. Many of these
stolen works were eventually sold or given
to museums, both in Europe and elsewhere.
General Eisenhower inspecting stolen art.
Hermnann Goering' collection of stolen art.
Gradually, the owners of stolen art and
their heirs began to demand return of
their property. This process escalated in
the 1990s, as electronic databases and the
internet proliferated. For many Holocaust
survivors and their families, these claims
vindicated not only their right to recover
their stolen property, but also their claims
to justice and right to be heard.4
Seventy years after the end of the Second
World War, illegally acquired art contin-
ues to resurface, often through the efforts
of organizations like the Commission for
Art Recovery and others." Perhaps most
notably, in 2012, German police discovered
1,406 works in the Munich home of Cor-
nelius Gurlitt, many of which were stolen.
The collection included Old Masters as well
as works by Claude Monet, Pierre-Auguste
Renoir, Henri Matisse, Franz Marc, Marc
Chagall, Otto Dix, and Max Liebermann,
and many others. Some of the works have
already been returned, but the provenance
of many others is still being investigated.4 3
Meanwhile, many important works are still
missing, and many museums still resist
legitimate claims.4 4
CONCLUSION
Obviously, "art law" is not a unified body
of legal doctrine, but a syncretic collection
of legal rules and social practices governing
a wide range of different scenarios. Yet, it
derives some degree of cross-disciplinary
commonality from the fact that it gov-
erns situations involving the same people,
engaging with each other in familiar cir-
cumstances, through the lens of shared
social expectations. Artists, galleries, col-
lectors, and museums are all repeat players
in the same game, and all know how the
game is played, or at least is supposed to
be played. Their expectations shape not
only their transactions, but also how those
transactions should be interpreted.
In other words, while studying "art law"
may not improve our understanding of "the
law" itself, it may improve our understand-
ing of how people use the law, and what
they expect it to accomplish: the "law in
action."This is hardly a new observation, or
one unique to art law. After all, it is equally
true of "the law of the horse." But if we
want to understand how the art world is
both shaped by legal doctrine and shapes
legal doctrines to fit its needs, we cannot
simply observe particular trouble-cases and
ask how they were decided."5 We must ask
how they function within the broader ecol-
ogy of the art world, and how they were
accommodated. BB
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